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Comments
CONSTTUTIONAL LAW--SixTh AlZENDmNT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-
mGiTr OF DEFEND)ANT TO BE PRxsEN AT CmnNAL TkAL-During
his 1957 trial for armed robbery, defendant William Allen in-
sisted upon conducting his own defense.' His abusive language on
voir dire2 led the trial judge to warn him that further outbursts would
result in his exclusion from the courtroom. The defendant defiantly
stated that "there's not going to be no trial," and that he would con-
tinue to disrupt the proceedings. 3 The trial judge then ordered him
removed and selection of the jury was completed in his absence.
Before the jurors appeared for the trial, however, the defendant
indicated that he wished to return and was allowed to do so con-
tingent on his conduct. When he became unruly, the trial judge
again ordered him excluded until he promised to conduct himself
properly. Except for purposes of identification, he did not return
during presentation of the prosecution's case, but was present for the
remainder of the trial. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Illinois.
4
A federal district court denied Allen's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the sixth amendment right to be present and confront
witnesses at a criminal trial was "absolute" and could not be waived
by forced election between proper conduct and exclusion from the
proceedings. Physical restraint of the defendant, the appellate court
held, should be employed when necessary to maintain order.5 Certio
rari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. Held: Reversed.
A defendant's continued disruption of court proceedings, after fair
and adequate warning by the trial judge, may constitute a voluntary
waiver of his right to be present at trial. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. 1057
(1970).
1 Counsel was appointed, however, to "protect the record." 413 F.2d 232 (7th
Cir. 1969).2 When instructed by the trial judge to confine his questions to matters
relating the juror's qualifications, Allen began to argue disrespectfully. Appointed
counsel was asked to continue the examination of jurors. Allen then warned the
judge "[wihen I go out for lunchtime, you're going to be a corpse here," tore
counsel's file, and threw the papers on the floor. Id. at 233-34.
3 Id. at 234.
4 Illinois v. Allen, 37 Il. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
907 (1967).
5 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
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When considering the exclusionary power of a trial judge, it should
be noted that from the time criminal proceedings began to take form in
early Anglo-Saxon law, presence of the accused was deemed essential."
The common law right to be present has been recognized and preserved
in the Constitution through the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment and applied to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.7 In addition, federal courts require
presence of the accused under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure" and every state grants the right to be present
by constitutional provisions, statutes, or court decisionsY
On surface these gilt-edged guarantees would seem to conclusively
bar removal of a defendant from his trial. However, certain common
law exceptions to the right existed'0 and have been transferred into
the twentieth century in many jurisdictions." Thus, while the right
to be present is granted in every jurisdiction, widespread disagreement
exists as to whether it may be waived. The main distinction in waiver
6Early criminal proceedings were somewhat analogous to modem civil
actions in personam, with one party seeking redress for the wrong committed by
the accused. By its very nature, therefore, a valid judgment could not be rendered
in the absence of the accused. Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of
the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 COLTm. L. REv. 18 (1916). See also Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Echert
v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951); People v. Isby, 30 Cal. 2d 879,
186 P.2d 405 (1947); State ex rel. Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d
126 (1949).7 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Shields v.
United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 129 F.2d 954
(3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
8 A concise summary of procedural stages at which presence of the accused
is required under FED. R. Cinm. P. 43 is contained in L. OswmL, CGn~mnA. PRo-
caumR' UNDER Tm FEDERAL RuLs §§ 43.3-43.7 (1967).
9 A majority of states require presence of the accused at every stage in the
proceedings. See e.g., Schwab v. Bergren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892); Harris v. Indiana,
231 N.E.2d 800 (1967); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1968).
A substantial minority, however, deem it essential only at certain stages, in-
cluding voir dire, Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); cross-examination,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); instructions to the jury, Shields v. United
States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927); United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1946);
and verdict, Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. 769 (14 Bush) (1879).
For a comprehensive survey of state constitutional and statutory provisions,
see Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant From His Own Trial, 36
U. CoLo. L. REv. 171 (1964).
10 The most common exceptions involved the defendant who absconded or
who failed to appear while on bail. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442
(1912); United States v. Switzer, 252 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1958); Noble v. United
States, 300 F. 689 (9th Cir. 1924).
11 The Supreme Court, for example, has held:
The right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the
Sixth Amendment, but was a common law right having recognized
exceptions. The purpose of that provision . . . is to continue and
preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb its exceptions.
Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926).
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cases concerns the nature of the offense, i.e., whether the defendant
has been charged with a capital or noncapital felony.12 The majority
of jurisdictions, including the federal courts, forbid waiver in capital
offense trials.' 3 In noncapital trials, on the other hand, most courts
allow waiver if the accused has been present and voluntarily waived
the right.' 4 A few jurisdictions refuse to distinguish between capital
and noncapital cases and allow waiver in both.15 A few others have
no provision for waiver for either type of offense. 16
Waiver in all jurisdictions must be "Voluntary"'. 7 which has been
defined by the Supreme Court as the "intentional relinquishment of a
12 In nisdemeanor cases, defendants are almost universally allowed to waive
the right to be present at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. Cnvm. P. 43 (by written consent).
Ky. R. Cans. P. 8.28(3) states in part: "In prosecutions for misdemeanors, the
courts may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in the de-
fendants absence." Cf. Yates v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 725, 286 S.W. 1046
(1926).
13 See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)- Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574 (1884); Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961); Lee v.
State, 244 Ala. 401, 13 So. 2d 590 (1943); State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 106
P. 364 (1910); State v. Hartsfield, 188 N.C. 357, 124 S.E. 629 (1924).
14 The federal courts waiver provision is contained in Fa. R. Cans. P. 43:
... [i]n prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's
voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his presence
shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the
verdict.
See also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Cureton v. United States,
396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.
1951); Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950); United States v.
Barracota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); United States v. Vassalo, 52 F.2d 699
(E.D. Mich. 1931); United States v. Noble, 294 F. 689 (D. Mont. 1923); State
cases include Berness v. State, 263 Ala. 641, 83 So. 2d 607 (1953); State ex rel.
Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d 126 (1949); Scott v. State, 113 Neb.
657, 204 N.W. 381 (1925); Trombley v. Langlois, 91 R.I. 328, 163 A.2d 25 (1960).
15 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted this view. In a 1928 case,
Boreing v. Beard, 226 Ky. 47, 10 S.W.2d 447, the Court stated:
Some courts make a distinction between felonies that are capital and
other felonies, apparently with the distinction that the public is interested
in preserving the life of one innocent of crime, but we are unable to per-
ceive such a distinction. Id. at -, 10 S.W.2d at 450.
See also Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 158 S.W. 1103 (1913); Miles v. State,
222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E.2d 779 (1949).
16 Jurisdictions prohibiting waiver in all trials offer two rationales for their
position. The first is that the requirement of presence of the defendant is for the
benefit of the state as well as the accused, and thus cannot be waived by the
accused. See Booze v. State, 390 P.2d 261 (Okla. Crim. 1964); Blagg v. State,
36 Okla. Crim. 337, 254 P. 506 (1927); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600,
115 S.E. 679 (1923). The second reason is that presence of the accused is
essential to the jurisdiction of the court. See Neal v. State, 257 Ala. 496, 59 So. 2d
797 (1952); State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756 (1922); State ex rel. Boner v.
Boles, 148 W. Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964); State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va.
525, 96 S.E. 938 (1918). See also Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933 (4th Cir.
1966).
17When a suggestion has been made to an accused by the authorities that
he waive the right to be present, the defendant has not made a voluntary waiver.
Massey v. State 31 Tex. Crim. 371, 20 S.W. 758 (1892). A federal court has
more explicitly held that in order for a waiver to be voluntary, the accused must
(Continued on next page)
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known right or privilege."' 8 It has long been accepted that the volun-
tary absence of a defendant from his trial constituted waiver and
that the proceedings could continue in his absence.19 Only two
previous cases, however, have denied the accused the right to be
present as a result of his voluntary misconduct. In United States v.
Davis,20 a federal court of appeals upheld, without reference to the sixth
amendment, the lower court's expulsion of an unruly defendant,
stating:
The right of a prisoner to be present at his trial does not include
the right to prevent a trial by unseemly disturbance. The de-
fendant had the opportunity to be present at the whole of his trial
... [and] he was absent during a part of the opening, only because
of his own disorderly conduct. It does not lie in his mouth to com-
plain of the order which was made necessary by his own miscon-
duct, which he could at any time have terminated by signifying his
willingness to avoid creating disturbances. 21
In People v. DeSimone,22 the Illinois Supreme Court held that dis-
ruptive behavior may be deemed a voluntary waiver of the defendant's
constitutional right,2 8 commenting:
The constitutional privilege relied upon was conferred for the
benefit and the protection of the accused. Like any other right it
may be waived. Thus, where a defendant voluntarily absents him-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
intelligently waive both the right to be present and the right not to have the
trial continued in his absence. United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1969). Illness will not subject an accused to trial in absentia, but
absence due to a feigned or self-inflicted injury may be construed as voluntary.
Hill, Some Special Problems Commonly Encountered in Criminal Cases, in Seminar
on Practice and Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 283, 284 (1960). Absence due to
threats to the life of the defendant has been held a voluntary waiver. Vicks v.
State, 42 Ga. App. 451, 156 S.E. 729 (1931). Contra, Massey v. State, supra.
's Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19 A state court has remarked that by the adoption of Rules 43, supra note 15,
the Supreme Court put the imprimatur of due process upon the "inference of
waiver from voluntary absence." State ex rel. Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36
N.W.2d 126, 129 (1949). The implied waiver provision does not, however,
become operative until the accused has first appeared and submitted himself to
the court's jurisdiction. Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
It should be noted that there is a very important difference between an
express waiver and a waiver implied from the voluntary absence of the accused.
In the former case, the defendant's absence may be explained to the jury; in the
latter, it may not be, leaving the natural conclusion that "the defendant has fled
because of 'consciousness of guilt."' J. MooRE, FEDEtAL PRACTIcE § 43.02
(2d ed. 1970). As to the right of a court to insure the defendant's continued
presence at trial by revoking bail, see United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442
(2d Cir. 1961).
2025 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869).
21 Id. at 774.
229 ll. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).2 3 It should be noted that the appeal was based on ILL. CONsT. art 2, § 9,
which parallels U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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self from the courtroom... he is deemed to have waived his right
and cannot claim any advantage on account of his absence. The
same result must follow under the circumstances attending this
defendant's involuntary absence. It is obvious from the record that
defendant's removal was necessary to prevent such misconduct as
would obstruct the work of the court; such misconduct was in
turn, effective as a waiver of the defendant's right to be present.
2 4
In the instant case, the Supreme Court resolved the definitional
dilemma, construing "voluntary waiver" to include misconduct by a
defendant at his trial.2 5 As a case of first impression before the
Court, Allen reflects the conflict between society's interest in an orderly
judicial process and its interest in protecting individual rights, and
between the individual's right to be present and his right to appear
unfettered before the jury.
While stressing the paramount importance of order in the courts,
the Court emphasized that procedural safeguards must be followed,
e.g., that the accused be fully and fairly warned of the consequences
of future misconduct, that every reasonable presumption be indulged
against waiver, and that the accused must be allowed to return at any
time he agrees to conduct himself properly.26 To preserve order, the
Court endorsed three methods for controlling an unruly defendant: (1)
bind and gag him; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) remove him from
the courtroom. The method chosen will be left to the discretion of
the trial judge in each case.
27
Underlying the entire opinion is the spectre of total, chaotic dis-
integration of the judicial process.2 8 Warning that the democratic
system "cannot endure if we allow our precious heritage of ordered
liberty to be ripped apart amid the sound and fury of our time,"29 Mr.
Justice Brennan, concurring, quoted with approval from Falk v. United
States:
'The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused
person, placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safe-
guards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedu-
lously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that
law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them
into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own
24 People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d at ,138 N.E.2d at 562.
25 Illinois v. Allen 90 S. Ct. at 1060.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1061.
28 Circuit Judge Hastings' dissent in Allen v. Illinois conjures up visions of
'[shackles, chains, gags, and a courtroom full of deputy marshalls." 413 F.2d
at 236.29 Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. at 1063.
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safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal
liberty.'30
Thus, the Court, after balancing the interests involved, tipped the
scales of justice toward society's right to a functioning legal system.
Of the three options available to a court faced with disruption of
its proceedings, the contempt power should be exercised first. In many
cases it may suffice; in cases involving a defendant determined to
sabotage the proceedings, however, it probably will be of no avail.
3 '
Should the judge in such cases discontinue the trial until the accused.agrees to modify his conduct, the delay might well benefit the
contumacious defendant by making it more difficult to secure prosecu-
tion evidence and witnesses. In addition, the right to a speedy trial
militates against lengthy delays.32 Criminal contempt sentences im-
posed without a jury trial are limited to six months;33 however, a
jury trial for contempt could be an exercise in futility, with the de-
fendant disrupting each successive trial ad infinitum. Some judges,
notably Judge Julius Hoffman, have skirted the jury trial requirement
by levying several successive sentences of less than six months each.
34
But even lengthy sentences will have scant effect on those who face
more severe sanctions if the trial continues.
If contempt citations fail to deter disruption, the trial court will
of necessity face a choice between physical restraint and expulsion
of the defendant. The trial judge, at his discretion, may employ what-
ever measures are necessary to restrain an unruly defendant.s But
implicit in Allen is the Court's value judgment that enforcement of
the defendant's right to be present by physical restraint is more
detrimental to his interests than exclusion from the courtroom. Cer-
tainly the advantages secured by the right are so diminished as to be
30o90 S. Ct. at 1064 (concurring opinion), quoting Falk v. United States, 15
App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899).
a1 Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. at 1062.
32The constitutionality of indefinite recess of an unruly defendant's trial has
not been determined, but is at best, doubtful. See 6 WAxE FoREST INTRA. L. REv.
499, 506-07 (1970). Cf. Kiopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).3 3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).3 4 NmwswEK, March 2, 1970, at 25.
35 United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963); People v. Loomis,
27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938). The reasons for the trial judge's
exercise of discretion should be stated and included in the record. People v.
Stabler, 202 Cal. App. 2d 862, 21 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962); Flowers v. State, 43
Wis. 2d 352, 168 N.W.2d 843 (1969). Only the minimum amount of physical
force necessary to maintain the orde; and dignity of the proceedings may be
employed. DeWoif v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 287, 245 P.2d 107 (1952). Abuse
of discretion constitutes reversible error unless it can be clearly shown that the
accused suffered no prejudice thereby. Lias v. United States, 51 F.2d 215 (4th
Cir. 1931); Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390 (1916).
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almost nonexistent in the case of a bound and gagged defendant who
can neither communicate with counsel nor participate in the proceed-
ings.
The probability of jury bias, moreover, toward a defendant in
chains has long been recognized. 36 These factors point to the inescap-
able conclusion that this method of control is the least desirable
judicial alternative. At this point the exercise of a defendant's right
to be present becomes prejudicial to the interests of both the individual
and society in a fair trial.
While a cardinal rule of crimirnal procedure has bepn and must
continue to be that "after indictment found, nothing shall be done in
Lhe absence of the prisoner,"37 obstreperous defendants in some
instances may force qualification of that right. The soft underbelly
of the American judicial process was dramatically exposed by the
recent "Chicago 7 (or 8)" trial in which deliberate disruption of the
proceedings was used as a tactic to force a mistrial. In Seale v.
Hoffman, 3 8 a federal district court upheld the handcuffing and gagging
of Black Panther leader Bobby Seale as the only means available to
preserve order. Both Seale v. Hoffman and the Seventh Circuit's Allen
opinion3 9 on which it relies, forbid removal of a defendant under any
circumstances; but both also have disregarded the established excep-
tions to the right to be present, the detrimental effect on the jury of a
shackled defendant, and the existence of the right to appear free
from physical restraints. 40 Their rigid insistence on "absolute" defini-
36 In State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965), the court
expressed doubt whether any jury
•.. can ever dismiss from its mind that the accused has appeared before
it in handcuffs or chains. His being restrained must carry obvious impli-
cations even to the most fair-minded of juries. Id. at 168, 206 A.2d at 205.
The fear that the presumption of innocence until proven guilty will be destroyed
has been well articulated:
When a court allows a prisoner to be brought before a jury with his hands
chained in irons ... the jury must necessarily conceive a prejudice against
the accused as being, in the opinion of the judge, a dangerous man....
State v. Temple, 194 Mo. 237, 245, 92 S.W. 869, 872 (1906), quoting
State v. Krng, 64 Mo. 591.
See also Murray, supra note 10; 23 VANn. L. REv. 431, 435-36 (1970).
At common law, the accused was entitled to appear free from all shackles in
order to avoid bias. Practical exceptions to the rule were recognized, however,
including restraint when necessary to prevent escape (4 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
i_.NTA Es *332) or to maintain order at trial. See, e.g., Odell v. Hudspeth, 189
F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946);
People v. Mendola, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473, 140 N.E.2d 353 (1957); Comment, Violent
Misconduct in the Courtroom-Physical Restraint and Eviction of the Criminal
Defendant, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 443 (1967).3 7 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).,
38306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. M11. 1969).
39 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d!2.82 (7th Cir. 1969). See
note 5 supra, and accompanying text.4 0 See notes 11, 12, and 37 supra, and accompanying text.
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lions does not seem, in these cases, to operate in favor of the accused.
Every available means should be employed to minimize the effects
of removal from the courtroom.41 Various devices, including use of a
plastic "isolation booth" similar to the one designed for the Eicbman
war crimes trial in Israel, have been suggested.42 Closed circuit tele-
vision transmission of the courtroom proceedings to the defendant in
another room is another possibility.43 Both have advantages: the
booth would allow the defendant to actually be present in the court-
room while the television system would allow the defendant to observe
the witnesses against him while guaranteeing that order is preserved
in the courtroom. The cost of implementing these safeguards probably
makes them unlikely at present for all courts. But should disruption
of criminal trials become a frequent occurrence, safeguards will have
to be developed and used if courts are to afford the maximum
protection to the accused while resisting the challenge to their
authority.
The delicate balance between the orderly functioning of the
judicial process and the protection of individual constitutional rights
will be severely tested in Allen's wake. Mr. Justice Douglas, while
agreeing with the basic hypothesis of the decision and its application
in "classical criminal cases," emphasizes the necessity for formulating
new judicial guidelines for other, more complex, situations which will
arise in the future. Stare decisis will clearly be inadequate as the sole
determinant for decision-making in cases involving factors absent in
the Allen case. One future area of concern, the mentally ill defendant
whose disruptive actions are not volitional although he is legally com-
petent to stand trial, presents a dilemma requiring a thorough re-
examination of interests and values.44
Two other kinds of cases, however, provide an even more funda-
mental challenge to the judicial process and the constitutional system.
Political trials have been a not uncommon occurrence in the history
of the American republic, and great injustices have been done to
unpopular minorities by "sincere, law-and-order men of their day."45
41 Mr. Justice Brennan. concurring, suggested that the disadvantages of ex-
clusion be mnitigated "as far as technologically possible in the circumstances."
Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. at 1064.
42 TIm, Feb. 23, 1970, at 14.
43 Id.
44 Some evidence in the record indicates that Allen was mentally ill at the
time of his trial. However, as Mr. justice Douglas states, staleness of record-the
original trial took place 13 years before the instant decision-prevented adequate
documentation. Illinois v. Allen, 90 S. Ct. at 1067 n. 5 (concurring opinion).45 Mr. Justice Douglas cites the 1670 trial of William Penn as an example.
Illinois v, Allen, 90 S. Ct. at 1065-67.
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The ominous consequences of an extension of Allen to political trials
is suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas. He asks:
Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from the courtroom
during a trial because he was insisting on his constitutional rights,
albeit vociferously, no matter how obnoxious his philosophy might
have been to the bench that tried him? Would we uphold con-
tempt in that situation?46
A third unresolved problem area involves trials used as a tactic by
radical minorities for their own political ends. Deliberate disruption,
designed to incite the extreme right into promulgating repressive
measures, has historically been utilized by extremist groups to rally
support for their attack on the system.
Each of these situations, like Allen, involves not simply a struggle
between right and wrong, but a confrontation between two conflicting
"rights." Each demands careful and responsible consideration of the
interests on both sides.47 The primary importance of Illinois v. Allen
may well lie in its application to these complex and menacing cases
of the future.
Donna H. Terry
ADmmnSTRATrvE LAw-SELEctnrE SERvicE-CoNscIENTmous OBJECroR
DmEMMA-QUESTION STUL UNRsoLv.E-Elliot Ashton Welsh refused
to submit to induction into the military service and was found guilty
in a United States District Court for violating federal law which makes
it a crime to refuse service in the Armed Forces.1 On June 1, 1966, he
was sentenced to three years in prison. Welsh asserted in his defense
that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form and therefore should be exempted from combat and noncombat
service based on Section 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act which exempts "any person... who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war
46 Id. at 1067.
47 See generally, Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. Rxv. 1
(1943) Note The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights-A Problem of Judicial
Method, 23 VQW. L. Rv. 792, 807-08 (1970).
150 U.S.C. App. § 462 (a) (1964) which provides in part:
[Alny person... who othervise evades or refuses registration or service
in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title [said sections]
... or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to
F erform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title
said sections] . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for
not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both ...
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